Abstract-We investigate the feasibility of constructing a data-driven distance metric for use in null-hypothesis testing in the context of arms-control treaty verification. The distance metric is used in testing the hypothesis that the available data are representative of a certain object or otherwise, as opposed to binary-classification tasks studied previously. The metric, being of strictly quadratic form, is essentially computed using projections of the data onto a set of optimal vectors. These projections can be accumulated in list mode. The relatively low number of projections hampers the possible reconstruction of the object and subsequently the access to sensitive information. The projection vectors that channelize the data are optimal in capturing the Mahalanobis squared distance of the data associated with a given object under varying nuisance parameters. The vectors are also chosen such that the resulting metric is insensitive to the difference between the trusted object and another object that is deemed to contain sensitive information. Data used in this study were generated using the GEANT4 toolkit to model gamma transport using a Monte Carlo method. For numerical illustration, the methodology is applied to synthetic data obtained using custom models for plutonium inspection objects. The resulting metric based on a relatively low number of channels shows moderate agreement with the Mahalanobis distance metric for the trusted object but enabling a capability to obscure sensitive information.
I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

R
ADIATION identification systems have been recently proposed for classification tasks involving treaty accountable items (TAIs) in the context of arms control treaty verification. Some techniques acquire and analyze imaging data of TAIs and thus require the use of traditional information barriers (IBs), either physical or digital and oftentimes both, to stop the monitoring party from gaining access to classified information (e.g. [1] ). Fig. 1 illustrates the use of information barriers in such traditional methods. The use of such barriers has the side effect of reduced confidence in the verification results. Recently, MacGahan et al. proposed the use of observer models to process data in list mode format in order to perform binary discrimination tasks without an IB in the data analysis stage [2, 3] .
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Matthew A. Kupinski, and Christopher J. MacGahan are with the College of Optical Sciences, The University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA. In this investigation we focus on the null-hypothesis tasks. The objective is to test the hypothesis that the measured TAI is of a specific type, or has certain physical characteristics. We propose the use of a quadratic-form distance metric to quantify the discrepancy between an object being observed and a trusted TAI (that conforms to the hypothesis being tested) while accounting for nuisance parameters, i.e. sources of object, detector, or environmental variability that can affect the measurement results but are not relevant to the verification decision. Many conventional distance metrics, such as the chi-squared family and Shannon's entropy family [4] , consider the distance between two probability density functions. We propose the use of distance metrics to quantify the discrepancy between an object (with associated data Q ∈ R n ) and a collection of realizations of a trusted TAI by computing a distance from the observed data (of the tested object) to a center P ∈ R n of the data pertaining to the trusted TAI. In this setting, the tested object would be considered an outlier if the resulting distance is larger than some predetermined value and subsequently the null-hypothesis is rejected. A conventional measurement of quadratic distance from a point Q to a location P given a scaling matrix S is the Mahalanobis squared distance (MSD) [5] given by
In a realistic setting there are various sources of uncertainty which we consider as nuisance parameters. The MSD metric allows us to incorporate these parameters by accounting for the resulting variation in the observations to inform the scaling matrix S. One common approach is to choose S to be the covariance matrix on the ensemble of images obtained of the trusted TAI while varying these nuisance parameters. The resulting metric will be robust to nuisance parameters. However, the metric in its classic form would need to be computed behind an IB as knowledge of the observation Q allows for possible reconstruction of the test object and possible access to classified information. To help alleviate this issue, we will explicitly construct a low rank representation of the inverse of the matrix S, denoted by A. Although normally S and subsequently A are fully ranked, we will resort to a low ranked approximation as A = XX with X ∈ R n×m , m n. The resulting metric has the form
It is clear that the distance d X uses m projections of the discrepancy vector (Q − P) onto the m column vectors of X denoted by X i , i = 1, . . . ,m. These projections can be accumulated sequentially while processing the testing data in list-mode (LM) format, and subsequently the projections squared are accumulated as illustrated in Fig. 2 . We will not limit ourselves by constraining X to approximate the inverse A of the covariance matrix S. Instead, X will be determined such that the resulting distance metric, d X , (a) relies on a small number of projections in order to limit the probability of exposure of sensitive information to the monitor, (b) captures the Mahalanobis squared distance of the training data B j , j = 1, . . . ,n B , and (c) could not distinguish object C from B for the realizations provided by C k , k = 1, . . . ,n C . Put differently, the resulting metric would optimally capture the Mahalanobis squared distance of the training data B j , j = 1, . . . ,n B , with the added feature that the resulting metric is insensitive to the difference between data B j from the trusted object and data C k from another object differing from the trusted object only in terms of parameters deemed sensitive (e.g. dimension, mass, etc.). To that extent, the matrix X is chosen as the minimizer to an objective function, as in
Fig. 2: Schematic outlining proposed approach to hypoth-esis testing with sufficient information protection at mea-surement and analysis stages. Events of of a declared TAI (right) are processed sequentially (without aggregation) in obtaining relevant projections which in turn provide the distance metric (test statistic).
In Eq. 3, the term in front of the regularization parameter λ captures the discrepancy between the means and variances in the resulting metrics for data B j and C k . Essentially, this term aims to approximate the difference in the distribution of the two sets of metrics. In the above formulation, λ plays a decisive role on the resulting minimizerX λ . A big value for λ results in a bad distance metric when applied to the training data B j while a small value results in a metric that is overly sensitive to the differences between data set C k from data set B j . There are many methods to determine a good value for λ (see e.g. [6] ). Herein we choose λ by balancing the two terms in the objective function through successive trials with varying λ values. Note that the objective function in Eq. 3 could be extended to handle multiple such "penalized" objects C in order to cover a multi-dimensional sensitive parameter space.
II. APPLICATION TO SIMULATED DATA For numerical illustration, we will consider a trusted plutonium object with three nuisance parameters describing the angular orientation of the object being imaged. The trusted object is the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) inspection object with label 8 [7] , which will be referred to as IO8. The simulated detector is a fast-neutron codedaperture imager [8] . For a tractable low-dimensional study problem we consider the measured low-resolution gamma spectrum rather than the complete measured neutron or gamma imaging information. Data used in this study were generated using the GEANT4 toolkit to model gamma transport through Monte Carlo simulations. A total of n B = 49 angular orientations in 3D were imaged with the resulting mean energy spectrum shown in Fig. 3 . The MSD metric is computed for the IO8 ensemble members with resulting values summarized in Fig. 4 . These MSD values will be used as d MSD (B j ), and we will use n C = 49 spectra corresponding to the inspection object with label 9 (IO9) with varying angular orientations in 3D, with a corresponding mean spectrum shown in Fig. 3 . Thus in this context IO9 is an object that is deemed to contain sensitive information under varying angular orientations. The MSD metric (trained with IO8 data) is computed for each IO9 ensemble member with resulting values summarized in We seek a low-rank representation of the matrix A with m = 4 projection vectors. Performing the optimization with λ = 1.0 results in the four projection vectors shown in Fig. 6 . The optimized metric has a normalized root-meatsquare error of 20% with relation to the MSD metric for the 49 IO8 realizations. The distance metric for the 49 training sets is summarized in Fig. 7 . The optimized projection vectors also result in a metric whose value for the 49 IO9 objects is illustrated in Fig. 8 . The level of scatter and mean value in the optimized metric for both IO8 and IO9 objects sufficiently match and thus the resulting metric may be deemed insensitive to the differences between the data sets pertaining to the IO8 and IO9 objects, as desired. Thus the resulting metric shows moderate agreement with the Mahalanobis distance metric for the trusted IO8 object while being unable to distinguish the IO9 object from IO8 (i.e. obscuring sensitive information). 
III. SUMMARY
We presented a framework for data-driven distance metrics for null-hypothesis testing in the context of armscontrol treaty verification. The metric is computed using projections of the data onto a set of optimal vectors. These projections can be accumulated in list mode and thus eliminate the need for an information barrier at subsequent stages of the analysis. The low-dimensional setting renders object reconstruction more difficult. For simulated data in the form of gamma-ray spectra of plutonium inspection objects, the projection vectors are optimal in capturing the Mahalanobis squared distance of the data associated with a given object under varying nuisance parameters. The resulting metric is insensitive to the difference between the trusted object and another object by construction.
